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A  PROBABILISTIC  MODEL  OF  LEARNING  IN  GAMES 
BY  CHRIS  WILLIAM  SANCHIRICO' 
This paper  presents  a new, probabilistic  model  of learning  in games  which  investigates 
the often stated intuition that common knowledge  of strategic  intent may arise from 
repeated  interaction.  The model  is set in the usual  repeated  game  framework,  but the two 
key assumptions  are framed  in terms  of the likelihood  of beliefs and actions  conditional 
on the history  of play.  The first  assumption  formalizes  the basic intuition  of the learning 
approach;  the second, the indeterminacy  that inspired  resort to learning  models in the 
first  place. Together  the assumptions  imply  that, almost surely,  play will remain  almost 
always  within one of the stage game's  "minimal  inclusive  sets." In important  classes of 
games, including  those with strategic  complementarities,  potential  functions,  and band- 
wagon  effects, all such sets are singleton  Nash. 
KEYWORDS:  Learning  in games,  rationalizability. 
FOR  ALMOST  HALF  A CENTURY  Nash equilibrium has been game theory's predom- 
inant solution  concept. Yet in recent years foundational  research  on games has 
focused on the need to shore up the justification  for equilibrium's  fundamental 
assumption:  in plain terms, that players  correctly  guess their opponents'  strate- 
gies. Figuring  large  in this new literature  is a resurgence  in research  on learning 
in games.  The learning  approach  rests on a simple  intuition:  namely  that players 
who play together repeatedly  will eventually  reach a common  understanding  of 
their strategic  intentions.  Translating  this intuition into concrete convergence 
results,  however,  has proven  to be no simple matter. 
Consider,  for example,  "fictitious  play."  In this leading model agents'  beliefs 
about their opponents' current actions are assumed to  equal the empirical 
frequency  of past opponent  play. Agents, moreover,  act "myopically"  in choos- 
ing to play a best response  to such beliefs without  regard  to the effect on their 
opponents'  future  beliefs. Shapley's  (1964)  well known  example  showed  that the 
resulting  empirical  frequencies  of play do not generally  converge.  More recent 
research,  however,  has focused on the model's  proclivity  to generate  nonconver- 
gent sequences of actual play even when frequencies  do converge.  Such is the 
case in Game 1.2 A simple geometric argument  confirms  that for a range of 
initial conditions the generated sequence of actions fails to converge to the 
game's unique pure equilibrium  (Heads, Out), but instead behaves as if the 
game consisted  solely of its Matching  Pennies component  (shaded).  Beliefs cycle 
1I wish to thank Truman  Bewley, Margaret  Bray, Joseph Chang,  John Geanakoplos,  Roger 
Myerson,  Phil Reny, Rafael Rob, Susan Rose-Ackerman,  the members  of Yale's game theory 
reading  group,  and seminar  participants  at the Econometric  Society's  1994  North  American  Summer 
Meetings, SITE's 1994 Summer  Workshop,  U. C. Berkeley  Economics,  Yale Law School, Yale 
Economics,  and the Universidad  Carlos III de Madrid's  1995 Summer  Conference  in Economic 
Theory.  I especially  wish to thank  David  Pearce  for his advice  and encouragement. 
2Game 1 is essentially  the same as an example  in Fudenberg  and Kreps  (1993). 
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Heads  Tails  Out 
Heads  It -1l1  1,2 
Tails  -1,1  1,j  -1.-4 
FIGURE 1.-Game  1. 
toward  the Matching  Pennies mixed  equilibrium  while actual  play cycles among 
the four action profiles. 
Convergence  of actual  play,  here and in general,  requires  the coordination  of 
two complementary  phenomepa. First, (Heads, Out) must be in some sense 
"absorbing."  Second,  there must be sufficient  "entropy"  in the system  to insure 
that play  reaches  (Heads,  Out) often enough  for this absorption  to occur.  Under 
fictitious  play, strict  equilibria  like (Heads, Out) are in fact immediately  absorb- 
ing in the sense that if they are ever played,  they are played  forever  after. Yet 
fictitious  play fails to converge  because the same rigid structure  that produces 
absorption  makes  the process  prone to eternally  ignore its absorptive  states. 
The central  problem  of learning  in games is to simultaneously  generate  both 
of these seemingly  contradictory  forces-absorption  and entropy-in  general 
games and from reasonable  assumptions  about how the history  of play affects 
current  beliefs. Such is the design  here. The paper introduces  a class of models 
defined by two mutually  consistent assumptions,  one each for absorption  and 
entropy.  Impotant  on their own, the assumptions  combine  to imply  convergence 
of actual play to one of the stage game's "minimal  inclusive sets" (Basu and 
Weibull  (1991)).  Roughly,  a minimal  inclusive  set is one that includes  all its own 
best responses, and no other sets with the same property.  In Game 1, for 
instance,  {(Heads,  Out)}  is the only minimal  inclusive  set. More generally,  such 
sets are generically  singleton,  Nash in games with strategic  complementarities, 
potential functions, identical interests, or bandwagon  effects. At  the  other 
extreme,  in Shapley's  example  and Matching  Pennies,  the whole set of profiles  is 
minimal  inclusive;  the paper leaves open the question of whether and how a 
common  understanding  of intent could develop  in such "irreducible"  games. 
An example  of a process  satisfying  the two assumptions  for Game 1 will help 
to introduce  the general approach,  describe  the assumptions,  and explain  how 
they imply convergence.  Given 0 ?  A  <  1, define for each player i  and each 
subset  of  stage  game  action  profiles,3 E cA  the  set  A (E) =  ei  E 
A(A  _j)I  +f r(E_ i) ?  A},  where A(A -  i) represents  the set of probability  measures 
on the set of opponent  actions, A-  . The set A(E)  represents  the event that i 
thinks her opponent likely to play within E__, with "likely"  defined by A. For 
3Ali  symbols used here are defined formally in the first paragraph of Section 2. PROBABILISTIC MODEL  OF  LEARNING  1377 
each  subset  B c  A(A  _i)  of  stage  game  beliefs  for  i,  let  ui(B)  represent  the 
measure placing unit weight uniformly on  B  and zero weight elsewhere.  Com- 
bining  notation,  consider  for  a  given  history  {a',...,  at-  1,  the  measure4 
ui( A(a'-r,...,a-')).  The  measure  puts  probability one  on  the  event  that  i 
believes  her opponent likely to repeat an action he has taken within the last  r 
periods.S  All beliefs consistent with this event are regarded as equally likely. The 
graph marked "A" in Figure 2, for instance, shows the frequency distribution of 
Ucol(  Ao('*))  when  r = 2 and Row has just played Tails twice in a row. 
In this  example the  measure  describing  i's  current beliefs  after the  partial 
history  {a',  . .,  a-  1}  is  a  convex  combination  of  the  measure 
u  (A(atr  ,  ar-1))  and a one period lag:6 
(1)  pi(a  at-  )  =  api(al,...,a'-2)  +  (1-  a)ui(A(at-r  t-l)) 
Thus,  the  measure  after  the  history  {a',...,a7,...,  aaT  t  is  just  a  geometric 
average of past ui(  A(a  r,  ..  .  a-  1))s.  Figure 2, for example, shows the progres- 
sion of  uco(AAoa(at-r,...at-l))  and pcoI(al...,at'-)  for a given history of play 
for Row, starting from given initial conditions, with  a = 1/2  and r = 2. Finally, 
assume  that  players' current beliefs  are  drawn independently  at  each  partial 
history  and  that  both  players  play  a  myopic  best  response  to  their  current 
beliefs. 
These  specifications  define  a  probability measure  P  on  the  set  of  all  se- 
quences {q,t,  at}  of beliefs and actions.7 The theorems of this paper imply that if 
we set  A 2 3/4  (which we do hereinafter), then  P  converges to (Heads, Out) in 
the sense that almost surely (Heads, Out) will be played almost always. In other 
words, P  assigns probability one  to the set of all sequences  {  4ft,  at} in which at 
remains at (Heads, Out) forever after some point. 
Before  explaining how this result obtains, it is worth emphasizing an impor- 
tant difference  between  this and more traditional learning models. Notice  that 
the measure pi(al,..  .,  at-  1) is not player i's belief about her opponent's choice 
at t, but rather, a probability measure on such beliefs. While learning rules such 
as fictitious play stipulate for each history what players' beliefs  certainly  are, this 
model specifies a measure describing what such beliefs  tend to be. This proba- 
bilistic approach rests on three general assertions: 
(i) Placing "extra-rational"  restrictions  on beliefs is unavoidable  given the indeter- 
minacy of rational strategic  interaction. A corollary to the literature on extensive 
form  rationalizability (Pearce  (1984))  is  that  rationality  alone  will  not  yield 
4I use sequential  notation  for both the sequence  and its range. 
5The parameter  r should  not be confused  with the parameter  p in Assumption  2. 
6All statements  made about  this system  of measures  applies  to any system  which  approximates  it 
in a particular  sense: the approximating  measures  always  assign  the same  weights  as (1) to each cell 
in a canonical  simplicial  subdivision  of the simplex  (of i's beliefs),  whose  cells have sides  with  length 
no greater than 1 -  A. 
7First,  specify  arbitrary  tie-breaking  measures  for the case where two or more actions  are best 
response to agent's stage game beliefs. Then apply Ash (1972, Theorem 2.7.2) to the product 














































2 PROBABILISTIC MODEL  OF  LEARNING  1379 
convergence.  In Game 1, for instance, wherein all actions are stage game 
rationalizable,  any sequence of action profiles {at} is consistent  with common 
knowledge  of rationality  in the extensive  form of the repeated  game.8 
(ii)  Such "extra-rational"  restrictions  should reflect  the indeterminacy  that necessi- 
tates  their  use. The usual way to impose  extra-rational  restrictions  is to stipulate 
that players  form their beliefs according  to a particular  learning  rule, such as 
fictitious  play.  In contrast,  the probabilistic  approach  introduced  herein eschews 
rigid, formulaic  algorithms  in favor of probabilistic  statements  about the ten- 
dency of players  to think the past repeats itself. The necessary  restrictions  are 
thus cast in a manner  that acknowledges  and incorporates  our agnosticism  about 
how players form their beliefs (c.f., Gul (1991) and Milgrom and Roberts 
(1991)). 
(iii) Formalizing indeterminacy  in a probabilistic  framework is a natural way to 
generate  entropy.  If we believe that many things are possible after each partial 
history  of play,  then we must also believe it likely that many  things will happen 
over time. Thus, to the extent that convergence  requires  both absorption  and 
entropy,  the use of probability  theory  makes  the model not only more palatable, 
but also more effective in generating  convergence. 
Returning to  Game 1, convergence here  follows from two intermediate 
results,  which follow in turn from two properties  of the process9  (1). The first 
result is that (Heads, Out) is eventually  absorbing:  conditional  on the event that 
(Heads, Out) is played infinitely  often, it will be played almost always (i.e., 
always,  after some point) with probability  1. Eventual absorption  is in turn a 
consequence  of the manner  in which (Heads, Out) feeds back on itself under 
this process. 
Feedback  follows  jointly  from  (1) and the best response  properties  of (Heads, 
Out). The more (Heads, Out) is played,  the more often and predominant  it is in 
recent history,  (a-  ..  . , a  '),  and so the more probable  it is that both players 
think their opponent likely to play (Heads, Out) again (since each player i's 
current  beliefs  pi(al  . .  .  , at-l)  are  a  geometric  average  of  past 
ui(Ck(a  ar...aT  1))  measures). This much is true of  all action profiles. Since 
(Heads, Out) is an equilibrium  (and A is large enough),  each player  does in fact 
repeat her part of (Heads, Out) when she thinks  her opponent  likely to do the 
8To "rationalize" {at)OW,  for example, construct the history-independent strategy SRow  prescrib- 
ing  aROW  at  all  time-t information  sets/stage  games. Since all Row's actions are stage game 
rationalizable,  aROW  is stage game best response  to some  stage game beliefs  qLRow  on  Column's 
rationalizable  actions.  By the classic  measure  theorem  (see, e.g., Ash (1972,  Corollary  2.7.3))  we can 
then find a repeated  game prior  A-Row  that is supported  on similarly  history-independent,  stage 
game  rationalizable  strategies  for Column,  and induces 1  t  R  ow at each time-t  information  set. Since 
Row  believes  his current  actions  do not affect Column's  future  play,  SRow is a perfect  best response 
to  I_ROw,  whatever  Row's  discount  factor a E [0,1). Thus,  the sequence  {a  ow} is generated  by a 
perfect best response to a prior that is supported  on similarly  structured  strategies  for Column, 
which  may  be similarly  rationalized. 
9Convergence  is no easier to prove for this example  than for the general  case and so, to save 
space,  the following  analysis  is confined  to explanation  of these properties  rather  than  proof. 1380  CHRIS  WILLIAM SANCHIRICO 
same. Hence, the feedback:  the more (Heads, Out) is played,  the more likely it 
is to be played  yet again. 
Feedback  per se, however,  is not enough  to generate  eventual  absorption.  For 
example, the probability  that (Heads, Out) is repeated might increase to an 
asymptote  of 2, implying  that almost surely  (Heads, Out) is infinitely  often not 
played.  Indeed,  the bare fact that the probability  of (Heads, Out) approaches  1 
is also not sufficient.  Theorem 1, however,  establishes  that eventual  absorption 
does follow if the feedback is  uniformly  summable:  i.e., the probability  that 
players  think (Heads, Out) likely to recur always  increases  (in the number  of 
times in a row'  n that it has played)  faster  than 1 -  xn for some uniformly  chosen 
(across t), nonnegative,  summable  sequence {xnj. Such is the case here, where, 
as the reader can check, after n + r -  1 plays of (Heads, Out), the chance that 
the players  jointly  think it likely to recur  is always  at least 
[(1 -a)(1  +a+  +  ..  +an-1)]2  =  [1 -an]2  =  1-(2a  - a2). 
The proof that eventual absorption  follows from uniformly  summable  feed- 
back has two steps. By an argument related to  the  second Borel-Cantelli 
Lemma, the summability  condition  just discussed implies that every time we 
arrive at (Heads, Out) there is some chance we stay there forever. Since the 
summability  is uniform,  this chance is uniform  as well. An argument  from the 
first Borel-Cantelli  Lemma  then establishes  that this small  chance of absorption 
on each arrival  translates into a long run certainty,  so long as we arrive at 
(Heads, Out) sufficiently  often. 
Arriving  at (Heads, Out) sufficiently  often is the role of this process'  second 
key property,  best  response  entropy:  namely,  if the profile  a is a best response  (for 
both players)  to a, and d is played  at t, then the chance  that a will be played  at 
t + 1 is, in this example, never less than ((1/16)(1 -  a))2.  Importantly,  the 
chance is uniformly  (over t) bounded away from zero. The indeterminacy  of 
rational strategic interaction  might suggest that anything  is possible after all 
partial  histories.  Applied  literally,  this precludes  any form of convergence.  Best 
response  entropy  insists  only that best responses  to actions  played  recently-ac- 
tions that are in a sense still "in play"-be  regarded  as possible.  The degree of 
entropy  over current  play is thus a function  of whether  recent history  has many 
or few best responses,  which  depends  in turn on whether  recent history  is itself 
diffuse  or concentrated. 
That best response entropy implies infinite plays of  (Heads, Out) is the 
content of Theorem 2. For intuition, note that if (Heads, Out) is not played 
infinitely  many times, some other profile in this finite game, say (Tails, Tails), 
must be. But, because (Tails, Heads) is a joint best response to (Tails, Tails), 
each time the former is played, there is a chance the latter is played in the 
following period, implying  that (Tails, Heads) is  also played infinitely  often. 
Continuing  the argument  to (Heads, Heads) and then (Heads, Out) we obtain  a 
contradiction.  There being such a "best response chain" from all profiles to 
(Heads, Out), the result follows. PROBABILISTIC MODEL  OF  LEARNING  1381 
Taken alone, uniformly  summable  feedback is consistent with the perfor- 
mance of  fictitious play in  Game 1. Best  response entropy on  its own is 
consistent  with drawing  action profiles  in i.i.d. fashion. Together,  however,  the 
properties  imply  almost sure, almost always  convergence  to (Heads, Out). Best 
response entropy gives Pr(Heads, Out) i.o.) = 1, where i.o. means infinitely 
often. Uniformly  summable  feedback  yields Pr((Heads,  Out) a.a.j(Heads,  Out) 
i.o.) =  1, where a.a. means almost always.  The product  of these is the conver- 
gence result. 
It is worth noting that this convergence  is not a special case of Kalai and 
Lehrer's  (1993) model of "rational  learning."  Indeed, so long as A  < 1, one can 
show that players  will almost  surely not put positive  weight on the true path of 
play-what  is required  by rational  learning's  absolute  continuity  assumption  in 
this context.  Yet the main point of comparison  with rational  learning  is perhaps 
more methodological  than technical. Arguably,  rational learning's  assumption 
that i puts positive  weight  on the true path of play10  is really  just another  way  of 
saying  that as play  unfolds,  i becomes more and more certain  and correct  in her 
beliefs about  the future  course  of the game1  -thus  begging  the question  of why 
this might occur. In  contrast, this paper is  an explicit attempt to  explain 
convergence.  The result is not in any sense a mathematical  restatement  of the 
fact of convergence,  but rather  a mathematical  formalization  of an explanation 
for convergence  that is fundamentally  behavioral:  namely,  that the right  combi- 
nation of indeterminacy,  and a self-intensifying  tendency for players to think 
that history  repeats itself, will lead players  over time to a common  understand- 
ing of their strategic  intentions. 
The theorems  and lemmas  of this paper  generalize  this introductory  example 
along several  dimensions.  First,  the model captures  the two highlighted  proper- 
ties of this example  in two assumptions  on general measures  over paths of play 
and beliefs. Any measure satisfying  these assumptions  is shown to converge. 
Second, convergence  is shown for general games, to one of the stage game's 
minimal  inclusive  sets. Third,  in the general model it is the probability  that a 
subset  is "salient"  that increases  as the subset  is played  repeatedly,  not necessar- 
ily the probability  that players think it likely to recur. As explained  within, 
salience  generalizes  the latter  to full hierarchies  of beliefs.  A final  generalization 
-not  included here-is  that players need not be myopic. It is enough that 
'0To be sure Kalai and Lehrer  (1993) allow for behavioral  strategies,  in which  case there is no 
one true path of play. This makes their theorems  more interesting  and difficult  than the results 
reported  here, but it does not defeat the basic criticism. 
1"  Let {a'} be the true path of play  induced  by the players'  repeated  game strategy  profile.  Let p, 
be the probability  that i places on the true action profile  a' in the stage game following  the true 
history  {a',...,  a'  1}. (We may  derive  this from i's strategy  and prior.)  The probability  that i places 
on the true  path is just rltI  pt. A basic result on infinite  products  says that FI , Tp,  > 0 for some 
X 2 1 is equivalent  to limT  HI  't  ,  pt = 1. But HI, Tpt  is just the probability  that i's prior  assigns  to 
the continuation WaT,  aT+  1,r..  of the true path from time  T  on. 1382  CHRIS  WILLIAM SANCHIRICO 
discount  factors  are sufficiently  small.  (Note that no matter  how small  a player's 
positive discount  factor, her current  beliefs may be so close to the break-even 
between two actions that future effects are decisive  in her current  choice.12) 
It is possible to construct  many  other examples  satisfying  the assumptions  of 
the general model. To come full circle, we can use the framework  to alter 
fictitious  play  so as to improve  its performance  in Game 1. We make  the weights 
geometric,  rather  than arithmetic,  and simultaneously  add some constant  posi- 
tive probability  that players play last period best response instead of what is 
dictated  by the re-weighted  fictitious  play beliefs: 
t 
J 
(3gu(1  +  (1 -13 )at?il,  with  probability  a, 
\ at-i 1,  with probability (1 -  a), 
where here '"at-1  represents the  belief putting unit weight on the action at-' . 
This system  of measures  clearly  satisfies  best response  entropy  and, proceeding 
as if  a = 1, one can show that 
x  =  ,  f ?  if n < ln(1/4)/ln  /3, 
n  ( 1  otherwise, 
is a uniform  (across t) lower bound on the probability  that the players  think it 
likely  that (Heads, Out) will be repeated  again after it has been played n times 
in a row.  (n < ln(1/4)/ln  8=  1 -  f3"  ?  (3/4)  = A.) 
The bounding  sequence here is almost always  zero: if (Heads, Out) is ever 
played ln(1/4)/ln,13  times in a row, it is played forever after. Contrast  this 
"lock-in"  dynamic  with the example  above  wherein  there is always  some chance 
of not playing (Heads, Out) no matter how many times it has been played. 
Hurkens'  (1994)  model of learning  by forgetful  players  also satisfies  the assump- 
tions of the general  model with a bounding  sequence that is almost  always  zero 
-always  zero for all  n  larger than the bound on memory. Sonsino (1994) 
generates convergence to patterns of play (see  the conclusion for more on 
patterns);  convergence  there also operates  by a similar  "lock-in"  dynamic. 
Section 2 of the paper sets out the general  framework  of the model. Section  3 
proves the two intermediate  results. The main convergence  result is proven  in 
Section 4, which also discusses the consistency  of the assumptions.  Section 5 
concerns the size of minimal inclusive sets in special classes of games and 
Section 6 concludes  the paper. 
1.  GENERAL  FRAMEWORK AND  ASSUMPTIONS 
Fix a stage game G = (A1,,..  .  Am;  vj,..., ,m),  where Ai  is player i's finite 
set  of  actions  and  iTe:  A1 x  ...  xAm  ->  9J  is  i's  payoff function.  For  any 
12For more details,  please see the appendix  to Sanchirico  (1996a). PROBABILISTIC MODEL  OF  LEARNING  1383 
subset E_  cA _  of  opponent action profiles,13 let  A(E- )  denote the  set 
of  all probability measures  f-i  on  A-i  with  fr_i(E_i) = 1. Extend  vi  to  an 
expected payoff function  u  i:  Ai x  A(A-  ) -->  M  in  the  usual  manner.  Denote 
the  set  of  (stage game) best responses  for player i to the belief  -i  E  (A -)  as 
bi  (  i). The set of  (stage  game) best responses  for player i to beliefs on any subset 
E_  cA-i  is  bi o A(E_)  U  q,  -  EA(E)bi(i).  Finally, for  any subset  E cA 
of  action  profiles  whether  or  not  rectangular,  define  b o z(E)  = 
(b1 ? A(E- ),.bm  A(E-m)). 
The model's assumptions  concern the manner in which the history of play 
affects the likelihood  of players'  belief hierarchies  regarding  opponents'  current 
actions.  A formal  statement  of these assumptions,  then, requires  both a defini- 
tion of such belief hierarchies  and a probability  space in which to cast state- 
ments about likelihoods.  For the first task we borrow  from Tan and Werlang's 
(1988) adaptation  of "types"  to uncertainty  regarding  strategic intent; let  &i 
denote the topological  space of stage  game  types  for player  i with respect  to the 
set of opponent action profiles A__, as in their Definition  3.9 (applied  to A_ 
rather  than A). For the second task we provide  the following  definition. 
DEFINITION  1: Define the probability  space  of action  / belief  paths for the game 
G  to  be  the  tuple  ([6  xA1,  5, P),  where: (i)  [  xxAI' denotes  the  set  of  all 
sequences {0,  at) of profiles of stage game types and actions, (ii) Z  is the 
product o-algebra  on [6?  x AYw  constructed  from the Borel sets on each copy of 
6  and the power set on each copy of A, and (iii) P:  ` 
-*  91 is a probability 
measure.14 
The object here is to generate common knowledge  of  strategic  intent from 
repeated play; common knowledge  of  rationality  is assumed from the onset. 
Assumption  0, which translates  the assumption  of common  knowledge  of ratio- 
nality into our probability  space, borrows  more from Tan and Werlang  (1988). 
First, the subset Ki c  6i  (from their Definition 5.2) represents  the set of all 
types for player i  consistent with common knowledge  of rationality.  Second, 
since by their Theorem  3.1 each Oi  may  be regarded  as a probability  measure  on 
A-i  x 6-i,  we may let Oi(A-i) and Oi(O_i) denote the marginal  of Oi  on A_ 
and O-i, respectively. 
131 use the following  conventional  notation  for products.  A product  set X1 x  X  X,, is denoted 
interchangeably  as X. Given  any subset S of a product  X1 X .  x X  X  (whether  or not the subset  is 
itself a product),  Si denotes  the projection  of S onto the ith factor  and S-i  denotes  the projection 
of S onto the product  of all factors  except  the ith. 
14Two technical  notes about this probability  space:  First,  since each pair of profiles  of repeated 
game strategies and beliefs (types) induces a unique sequence  ((01,  at)},  specifying P  is the same as 
specifying  a measure  on these repeated game objects (with an appropriately  defined 0-algebra). 
Second,  specifying  one "big"  P over all sequences  of stage game beliefs and actions  is essentially 
equivalent  to specifying  a separate  probability  measure  over current  beliefs and actions at each 
"node," {0', a',...  1, at- 1). See again Ash (1972, Theorem 2.7.2). 1384  CHRIS WILLIAM SANCHIRICO 
ASSUMPTION 0:15  Vt 2  1, Vi = 1,...  m, P([at e  bi(0/(A-i))]  CA [/  E K']) = 1. 
In the introduction's  example  the history  of play affected the probability  that 
players  thought  a given  subset E-i  of profiles  (there,  a singleton)  likely  to recur. 
In general, it need only affect the probability  that the set is "salient:"  every 
player i either believes it likely that his opponents will play in  E_i  in the 
incipient  stage game, or believes it likely that his opponents  hold such beliefs, 
or, believes  it likely  that his opponents  believe their  opponents  hold such  beliefs, 
or, etc...  up to  any order. (For simplicity  the parameter A and hence the 
qualifier  "likely"  is left out of the formal  definition  of salience.  The generaliza- 
tion is easily conceived,  yet tedious to denote.) 
For any product  X1 x  .X  X,,, and any subset Sk  of any factor  Xk, let (Sk> 
denote the "slab"  of Sk,  that is, the subset {x EX,  X  ...  X XmIXk  E Ski. 
DEFINITION  2: Fix a rectangular subset of action profiles E = El X ..x  Em C 
A.  Define,  for  all  i,  the  set  Sj(1)(E) = {0ti  E  01i0(A.)  E  A(E- )).  Continuing 
inductively,  given Sj(n -  1)(E) for each player  j, define 
Si(n)(E)  = {i  E(0 eilVj  # i, Vaj  E supp  0i(Aj), 
either ai E Ej or oi((  {aj)  n( Sj(n -  1)(E)) ) > o}. 
Then,  define  for  all  i,  the  set  Si(E)=  U '=  Si(nXE). Lastly, define  S(E) 
S,(E)  x  X Sm(E).  The subset E  is said to be salient at time t, if 0' E S(E). 
Assumption  1 is the source of the uniformly  summable  feedback  discussed  in 
the introduction.  Assumption  2 is the source of best response entropy.  Both 
assumptions  are parameterized,  the former by the class of subsets to which it 
applies, the latter by the length of recent history, p. This parameterization 
allows for two modes of convergence  in the main theorem. For each r c2A 
define: 
ASSuMPTION 1(r):  For all subsets of  action profiles E e r,  there exists a 
summable sequence {xn1 such that: 
(2)  Vt > 1, Vl < n < t-2, 
P(0Ot e S(E)lat-  .,at-n  eE;  at-n-1  ,4E)  1 -xv, 
if defined. 
For each p > 1 define: 
ASSUMPTION  2( p):  There  exists e > 0 such that  for all t ?  1 and all {a',...  , at-  1}, 
if a E b o({at-P,...,  at- 1)), then P(at = a{al,...,  at- 1)) >  ,  if defined. 
15Assumption  0  is  less  general  than  it  might  be.  First,  all  results  hold  with  a  sufficiently  small, 
nonzero  discount  rate.  Second,  (as  with  all  the  assumptions)  it need  only  hold  for  almost  all  t. Third, 
it  suffices  that  players'  play  a best  response  to  some  belief  that  is  "almost"  supported  on  the  support 
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2.  INTERMEDIATE RESULTS 
2.1  Inclusive Sets, Feedback, and EventualAbsorption 
Following Basu and Weibull (1991) let us say that a nonempty subset of action 
profiles E = E1 X .oo  XE_  cA  is (best response) inclusive, if bi o A(E-  ) cEi,  Vi. 
In Game 1 the entire set of profiles and (Heads, Out) as a singleton are the only 
inclusive sets. The importance of inclusive sets in this model of learning lies in 
the following lemma, which says that if rationality is common knowledge, then 
whenever an inclusive set is salient it will in fact be played in. The lemma thus 
establishes  that  inclusive  sets  feed  back on  themselves  under  Assumption  1. 
That this implies eventual absorption is the content of Theorem 1. 
LEMMA  1: If P  satisfies Assumption 0  and I  is  inclusive, then for  all  t >  1, 
P(a'  EtEII  S(I))  = 1, if defined. 
The proof, which appears in the  Appendix, is inductive on  orders of belief. 
For intuition, note that if i believes her opponents will play in I, then she, being 
rational, will  herself  play in  I,  since  I  contains  all  best  responses  to  itself. 
Similarly, if i  believes both that her opponents are rational and that they think 
their opponents  will  play in  I,  then  she  must  think that  her  opponents  will 
themselves play in I. Then, again, she will play in I. 
Let  [at E I  i.o.] denote  the  event  that play is in  I  "infinitely often"-in  set 
notation  nl  1  Us=t[as  EI].  Let  [at eI  a.a.] be  the  event  that  play  is  in  I 
"almost always," U t=  f  n  =t[as E I]. 
THEOREM  1 (Eventual Absorption):  For all  p ?  1 and all  Fc  2A,  if Assump- 
tions 0,  l(F),  and 2( p)  hold and I  is an inclusive  set in  F,  then P(at cI 
a.a.1at  cI  i.o.) =  1, if defined. 
A sketch  of the following  proof appears  in the introduction. 
PROOF: Let I  satisfy Assumption 1 with sequence {xnj. From Lemma 1 it 
followsthat  Vt19  Vl1<n<t-2, 
(3)  P(a , . .., a-  E=I; a--  14 I) 
> PO'  ES(I)M;  at-  1,... ,at-  =I; at--  ,4I). 
Combining  (3) with Assumption  1 yields:  Vt > 1, Vl < n < t -  2, 
(4)  P(at, ... .at-n  E. I;  at-n-I14  I ) 
>  (1 -xn)P(at-  1 ... , at-n  E I; atnl  t  I)1 
Re-indexing,  write (4) as: Vt > 1, Vn > 1, 
(5)  P(at+n+1,  . .  .  S  t+1  E I;at  1  I) 1386  CHRIS  WILLLAM  SANCHIRICO 
By Assumption 2 and the fact that I is inclusive, we may take xn < 1, all n. Now 
for  any  t,  the  family of  inequalities  in  (5)  indexed  by  n  yields,  by  iterative 
substitution: 
m  m 
(6)  P  n  It+n+  1nIt+I_It  2  (1-Xn)P(It+1  -It) 
n =1  n=  1 
where I have written, and will henceforth write It  for the event [at E I]. The fact 
that {xn} c [0,  1) and Exn  <  X implies that limm H0  fl  n=  1(  -  Xn)  exists and is a 
strictly positive number, call it  6. (See,  e.g., Knopp (1971).) Taking the limit of 
both sides in (6) yields: Vt 2  1, 
(7)  P  n  It+n+1  'nIt+1  _It)  > 6-P(It+1  _It). 
Now the sequence  of sets {n n=  =t+n+  1 n It+ 1  _  It}t=  1 is disjoint. Hence,  sum- 
ming the left side of (7) over all t ?  1 yields a number less than 1. Then since 
>  0,  (7)  implies  = 1P(It+1  -  It)  <oo.  Therefore,  by the  first Borel-Cantelli 
lemma P((It+  1  - It)  i.o.) = 0. A standard  argument  shows  [It  i.o.]  -  [It  a.a.]  c 
[(It+ 1 - It)  i.o.] and the result follows.  Q.E.D. 
2.2  Plateaus, Entropy, and Eventual Repulsion 
An inclusive set is said to be  minimal if it does  not strictly contain another 
inclusive set. The plateau of an inclusive set is constructed by removing from the 
inclusive set all smaller inclusive sets nested therein. (By convention the plateau 
of a minimal inclusive set is the empty set.) Thus, the plateau of the entire set of 
profiles in  Game  1 is  the  Matching Pennies  component  plus (Tails, Out).  In 
Game 1, but not in general, the plateau of the entire set of profiles corresponds 
to the grand  plateau: what remains of the entire set of profiles when we remove 
all minimal inclusive sets. 
Plateaus, and perhaps also the  grand plateau, will be  eventually repelling if 
recent  history  is  sufficiently  long.  What  length  suffices  depends  on  certain 
properties of the game's best response correspondence, which are summarized 
in the following notion of "size." (All results hold if we take the size of the game 
to be the number of profiles.) 
DEFINITION  3: For  all  subsets  E cA  and  all  action  profiles  a E E,  a  best 
response chain from a to E is a finite sequence of action profiles {a(1),. ..,  a(n)} 
satisfying: (i) a(1) = a, (ii) Vl < k < n,  a(k)  E b o  ({a(1), ..., a(k -  1)),  and (iii) 
a(n) E E. The  span of the  chain {a(1),...,  a(n)}  is defined as max1  <  k < n{min  j: 
a(k) E b o  ({a(k -  j),.  . .  , a(k -  1)})}.  Let a be an element  of a nonempty  plateau 
E. The size of the profile, a, is the smallest span across all chains from a to  -  E. 
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Recall that in discussing the application of Theorem 2 to Game 1, we noted 
the existence of a best response chain (of span 1) from every profile to (Heads, 
Out). More generally, one can show for all finite games the existence of such a 
chain  (not  necessarily  of  span  1)  from  every point  in  every plateau  to  that 
plateau's  complement.  This  insures  that  "size"  is  well  defined  and,  though 
implicit in the proof, is central to eventual repulsion. 
THEOREM  2  (Eventual  Repulsion  from  Plateaus):  Let P  satisfy Assumption 
2( p).  (i)  If  p 2  s(G),  then for  all plateaus  E cA,  P(at e E  a.a.) =  0.  (ii)  If 
p 2  Al, then P(at  E H  a.a.) = 0, where H  is the grand  plateau. 
A sketch of the following proof appears in the introduction. 
PROOF:  I  prove only part (i)  of  the  theorem.  Part (ii)  follows  in  the  same 
manner. Since the plateau  E cA  is finite, at least one of its members is played 
infinitely often,  so  that  [E'  a.a.] =[Et  a.a.] n  U a  E[at'=  a  i.o.]. Then  by the 
subadditivity of  P, 
(8)  P(Et  a.a.)  <  ,  P([at  =  a i.o.] n [Et a.a.]). 
aeE 
Now take any a E E. Let {a(1),...,  a(n)} be a chain from a(1) = a to  E that 
has the smallest span of all chains from a to  -  E (i.e. a chain whose span is the 
size of  a). We show 
(9)  P({at,  ...,  at-  l}  =  {a(1),...  a(n)}  i.o.)  = p(at  =a  i.o.). 
The "?"direction  is obvious since a(1) = a. To show " >  suppose, contra, that 
r < n  is  the  largest index for which (9)  does  hold with  ">  ". Now  a(r + 1) E 
b o A({a(r -  p +1),...,  a(r)}),  since  {a(1),...  a(n)}  is a chain with smallest span 
among those from a to  -  E and s(G)  < p. Hence, Assumption 2( p) insures the 
existence of  e > 0 such that Vt 2  1 and each individual history {a',...  , at- 1}  that 
has  {at-r,  ...  ,  at  1} =  {a(1),...,  a(r)},  P(at = a(r + 1)I{al,  ...  , at  1}) 2 s.  There- 
fore, by a standard result (see,  e.g., the appendix to Sanchirico (1996a)), 
P({at-r,  ...  , at  1} =  {a(1),...,  a(r)}  i.o.) 
=  P(([at  =  a(r +  1)] rn  [{at-r,  .  .  .,  at-  1} =  {a(1),...,  a(r)}])  i.o.) 
=  P({at-r,  ...  ,  at}  =  {a(1),...,  a(r +  1)} i.o.), 
contradicting our supposition. This proves equation (9), which in turn implies 
p([at  =  a i.o.]  n [Et a.a.]) 
=Pflat-n,  ... , at-l}  1=  {a(1),...,a(n)}  i.o.] rn  [Et a.a.]). 
But since a(n) 0 E, P([{at-n, .. ., at- 1}  = {a(1), ...,  a(n)} i.o.] n [Et a.a.]) = 0, and 
so  P([at =  a  i.o.] n [Et  a.a.]) =  0  also.  This  holding  for  all  a e  E,  the  result 
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3.  CONVERGENCE AND  CONSISTENCY 
Neither  Assumption  1 nor 2 guarantees  convergence  on  its  own. Fictitious 
play's performance in Game  1-as  observed in the opening paragraphs of this 
paper-is  fully consistent with Assumptions 0 and l(F),  even with  F  taken to 
be  the power set of  A.  Moreover, any probability measure that draws actions 
from Game 1 in i.i.d. uniform fashion is consistent with Assumptions 0 and 2( p), 
for any p. 
The  interaction of  these  assumptions, however, produces  a  strong form of 
convergence  to  minimal  inclusive  sets,  as  proven  below  in  Theorem  3.  The 
theorem  is  perhaps  best  understood  visually. Figure  3  depicts  a  stage  game 
((0,0)  payoffs  are  not  shown)  as  a  contour  map with  smaller  inclusive  sets 
marked with darker shading. Figure 4  translates this  contour map into  three 
dimensions  (making  clear  the  choice  of  the  term  "plateau").  The  second 
intermediate result, eventual repulsion, guarantees that we do not remain on the 
highest plateau almost always, implying that we are infinitely often in one of its 
"holes." In  particular, calling the  smaller hole  S  and the  larger L,  eventual 
repulsion  yields  p([at  E S  i.o.] U [a' e L  i.o.]) = 1. (Note  that  this  is  not  the 
same as "P([a'  E S i.o.]) = 1 or P([at  E L i.o.]) = 1."). Now split the event [at E S 
i.o.] U [at E L  i.o.] into two (intersecting) sections, [at E S  i.o.] and [at E L  i.o.], 
and consider first [at E S i.o.]. The first intermediate result, eventual absorption 
says that conditional on [at E S i.o.], the event [at E S a.a.] has probability one. 
Similarly, conditional  on  [at E L  i.o.], [at E L  a.a.]  receives  probability  one. 
Together  with  p([at  E S  i.o.] U [at E L  i.o.]) = 1, these  conditions  imply (with 
some Boolean  manipulation) that  P([at e  S  a.a.] U [at E L  a.a.]) = 1. In words, 
probability is divided between  those  sequences  of  play that stay in the  larger 
hole always after some point and those sequences  that stay in the smaller hole 
-  .  I 
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always after some point. Now, conditional on either of these  (disjoint) "almost 
always" events we reapply eventual repulsion and absorption in parallel fashion 
to whatever holes (even smaller inclusive sets) there may be in either S and L, 
respectively. (Since there are no holes in S, we work again with S itself.) When 
we eventually reach a level  at which none  of the inclusive sets has a hole, we 
have established that there is probability one  on those  sequences  of play that 
after some point remain in one of the stage game's minimal inclusive sets. 
This  describes  the  process  of  convergence  when  Assumption  2  holds  with 
recent  history  of  relatively  short  duration  and  Assumption  1  applies  to  all 
inclusive sets. Only one iteration is necessary if recent history is long enough to 
guarantee that the grand plateau does not absorb, in which case Assumption 1 
need only be applied to minimal inclusive sets. 
THEOREM  3 (Convergence):  Let P satisfy Assumptions 0,  l(F),  and  2( p).  If 
either (i)  F  contains all G's inclusive sets and p 2 s(G),  or (ii)  F  contains all G's 
minimal inclusive sets and p 2 IAl, then P( U {[at  E I  a.a.]1I is minimal inclusive}) 
=  1. 
PROOF:  Case (ii) follows directly from Theorems 1 and 2. For case (i) see the 
appendix to Sanchirico (1996a). 
If  p is smaller than the size of the game, then Assumption 0, l(F),  and 2( p) 
do not imply convergence. Game 2, for instance, is of size 2. One can construct a 
measure P  satisfying Assumption 0, l(F  =A),  and 2( p = 1), that puts probabil- 
ity  1  on  the  sequence  of  actions  generated  by  "last-period-best-response" 
starting from (Heads,  Heads):  namely, (Heads,  Heads),  (Heads,  Tails), (Tails, 
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Convergence  is  of  little  interest  if  no  probability measure  could  possibly 
satisfy the assumptions from which it has been shown to follow. Mere existence, 
however, is trivial. For any game G, let  j,..*,  q'm  be a mixed equilibrium in one 
of  G's minimal inclusive sets. The measure P  that, at each t, (i) puts unit weight 
on the type profile 0 such that (a) each player's belief about incipient opponent 
play is  i/l  x  ...  x  qi-l  x  'k  1 x  ...  X q,m  and (b)  "(a)" is  common  knowledge, 
and (ii) draws play according to  i/l  x  ...  x  rm, is consistent with Assumption 0, 
Assumption 1 applied to all subsets, and Assumption 2 for any length of recent 
history. The appendix to Sanchirico (1996a) shows that nontrivial measures exist 
for all games. 
4.  MINIMAL INCLUSIVE SETS  IN  SPECIAL CLASSES OF  GAMES 
This section concerns the size of minimal inclusive sets in classes of games for 
which  other  learning  processes  have  been  shown  to  converge  (in  a  manner 
weaker than proven here). The main result relies on a general theorem whose 
proof  is  straightforward and  so  omitted.  (For  more  details,  see  Sanchirico 
(1996b).) 
Let E be a rectangular subset of action space A. The restriction  of stage game 
G to  E, denoted  GE  is the finite game with strategy sets  E,  and payoffs 1TjIE. 
Let  R  be  a  property defined  on  the  set  of  all  finite  games.  We  say  R  is 
restrictable  to inclusive sets, if for all games  G with property R and all inclusive 
sets I in G, the restriction GI also has the property. The property: "has no more 
than one  (pure strategy) equilibrium," for instance, is restrictable to  inclusive 
sets, since all equilibria in the restriction of  G to an inclusive set are equilibria 
in  G  as well. The  property is not,  however, restrictable to  general  subsets  of 
profiles.  The  property "has  no  less  than  one  (pure)  equilibrium" is  not  re- 
strictable, even to inclusive sets. 
THEOREM  4:  If property  R implies the existence of a pure strategy  Nash equilib- 
rium and is restrictable  to inclusive sets, then in all games with  property  R for which 
all pure equilibria  are strict,16  all minimal inclusive sets are singletons consisting of 
strict equilibria. 
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For  lack  of  space  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  papers  cited  for  formal 
definitions of the classes in the following corollary. However, one new concept is 
required. Because the subset of a complete lattice may not be a complete lattice 
in its own right, general  supermodular games  are not  restrictable to  inclusive 
sets  and  so  not  subject  to  Theorem  4.  Let  us  say,  then,  that  an  ordinal 
supermodular  game  (Milgrom  and  Shannon  (1994))  is  restrictable, if  for  all 
inclusive sets  I, each  Ii is a complete lattice in its own right. Contained in this 
subclass  are  all  supermodular games  whose  strategy sets  may be  completely 
ordered, including all those analyzed by Krishna (1991). 
COROLLARY 1 (Singleton Minimal Inclusive Sets in Special Classes of Games): 
Let G be a finite game. All of G's minimal inclusive sets are singletons consisting  of 
strict equilibria, if any of the following hold: 
(i) G is a restrictable  ordinal supermodular  game all of whose pure equilibria  are 
strict, 
(ii) G is an ordinal  potential game (Monderer  and Shapley (1993b)) all of whose 
pure equilibria  are strict, 
(iii) G is a game with identical interests (Monderer and Shapley (1993a))  all of 
whose pure equilibria  are strict, 
(iv) G has the marginal bandwagon  property  (Kandori and Rob (1992)). 
PROOF:  By  Theorem  4,  we  need  only  show  that  each  property (i)-(iv)  is 
restrictable to  inclusive  sets  and  implies  the  existence  of  a pure  equilibrium 
(with a slight variation in case  (iv)). In all cases, restrictability follows directly 
from the definitions. For existence: (i) Existence of a pure equilibrium is given 
by  Milgrom  and  Shannon  (1991,  Theorem  15).  (ii)  Existence  is  given  by 
Monderer and Shapley (1993b, Corollary 2.2). (iii) Existence  is noted by Mon- 
derer and Shapley (1993b, p. 9). (iv) One  can show that the  definition of  the 
marginal bandwagon property implies the existence of a strict equilibrium. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
One direction for future research would be to extend the model to nonsimul- 
taneous stage games, including several plays of a given normal form. This would 
in turn allow convergence to patterns of equilibria in the simultaneous game, as 
in Sonsino (1994), but without the lock-in dynamic that operates there. It would 
also  be  broad  enough  to  encompass  convergence  to  equilibria  that  are  not 
simple sequences  of equilibria in the simultaneous game. Extending the model 
in this direction would also force confrontation with the observability problems 
identified in Fudenberg and Kreps (1988). 
16Clearly  some  sort  of  genericity  requirement  (such  as  the  requirement  here  that  "all pure 
equilibria are strict") will be  necessary, since  these  classes  of  games  typically include  those  with 
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Other directions  for future research  include discovering  the precise relation- 
ship between the "parameters"  in the two assumptions  (r,  {xnj,  p, and s)  and 
the speed of convergence,  and analyzing  the issue of which minimal  inclusive 
sets are likely to be selected. 
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APPENDIX:  PROOF OF LEMMA 1 
Take any inclusive set  I. I give the proof in two steps. 
Step 1: First I show that  0 E K n s(I)  implies  Oi(A _.)  e A(L_)  for all  i. For this it suffices to 
show that for all n and all i,  Oi  E Kl n Si(nXI)  implies  Oi(A  - i) E A(I_ ).  The proposition is true for 
all i and n = 1 by definition of Si(1XI).  Continuing inductively, suppose that, for all j,  Oj  E Kj n Sj(n 
-  1XI)  implies  Oj(A_j) E A(I_j).  Take  any  i  and any Oi  EKi n Si(nXI).  I must show Oi(A-  ) e 
A(I_i).  To this end take any j  #  i and any aj E supp Oi(A1).  I claim aj E Ij. By definition of Si(n)(I) 
either  (i) aj E I,  in which case we  are done,  or (ii)  0i(({aj}) n  (Sj(n  -  1XI)>) > 0. (Recall  that  Oi 
may be regarded as a measure on  9  x A _-  and that the notation  "(  )"  denotes the inverse image 
of the projection mapping.) Consider case (ii). First, since Oi  e Ki, we know that Oi((Kj(m -1))  = 1, 
for all  m.  Therefore,  Oi((Kj)) =  1 and, in  turn,  oi(({a,})  n  (Kj n Sj(n -  1XI)>) > 0. Then  by the 
inductive  hypothesis,  Oi(({aj)) n <0jE -9  j0j(A  i) E A(I-j))))>  O.  Second,  O E Ki c Ki(1)  also 
means that  Oi({(0j,  aj) E  9, xAjIaj  e  bj(0j(A -j))})  = 1, where the inverse projection here is with 
respect  to  the  factor  9j  in  &9-, x A _ i.  Combining these  two  implications yields  aj E bj ? A(I_j). 
Then since I  is inclusive, aj E Ij. 
Step 2:  For all t 2  1, 
P([  a'  E S(I)]) 
=P([Q0t E K n  S(I)])  (Assumption 0) 
fl [a  ei (A  0/)  =  (A)If /)  = SI](tp  m  m 
=P  n  [ ai E-  bi(0i (A_l,))]  n n[  [it(A  _i)  E  -A(I_i)]  n  Oat  E-  S(I)] 
i=l  ~~~~~~i=l1 
(Assumption 0) 
< P([at  E b  A  a(I)]  n [ Ot  E S(I)])  (Definition  of  A(E-i)) 
< P([at  E Ii] n [ 0t E S(I)])  (I  is inclusive). 
Hence,  P([at E Ii] n [ 0t E S(I)])  = P([ 0t  E S(M)])  or P([at e IilI[0't E S(I)])  = 1, if defined.  Q.E.D. 
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